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SMITH V. VAN GORKOM
WILLIAM CARNEY: We have a unique opportunity today, having
Mr. Robert Pritzker here with us. He was a participant in one of the
most famous cases in corporate law,1 one that Dan Fischel has
described as one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate
law, 2 and I’ve quoted him with approval on that particular judgment.3
But whatever you think of the quality of the judgment, the case is a
1. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Voluminous work has been written
about Van Gorkom. For an overview of scholarship concerning the case, see Symposium, Van
Gorkom and the Corporate Board: Problem, Solution, or Placebo?, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 447
(2002).
2. Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgement Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS.
LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) (calling Van Gorkom “one of the worst decisions in the history of
corporate law”).
3. William J. Carney, The ALI’s Corporate Governance Project: The Death of Property
Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898, 924 n.137 (1993).
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very important one. It seemed to be fact intensive, in the sense that
the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to pay a great deal of attention
to the factual background of what Mr. Van Gorkom did and what the
directors did. And Mr. Pritzker is in a position to provide us with
some additional information that might be useful for the historical
record about the development of that case. And I guess the first
question is, exactly how did the $55 number come about, that wound
up as the purchase price in this case?
ROBERT PRITZKER: It was a number that was selected by Jerry
Van Gorkom. And as I understand it—and I wasn’t there when they
made the decision what price they wanted—it was on the advice of
their internal people. Mr. Romans[, Chief Financial Officer of Trans
Union,] and some others had wanted to have a management buyout.
And I think he came up with a price somewhat similar to that. And
then the Boston Consulting Group had made a study—it was
something with Carpenter, I can’t think of his first name, he later
went with GE Capital—and he had been evaluating Trans Union for
some time—four months, something like that. And he had a lot of
input. The reason I say that is our due diligence was limited to one
week, and it was limited to three officers of Trans Union: Van
Gorkom, who was chairman and CEO, Chelberg, who was president,
and Peterson, who was vice president and controller. We could speak
to the three of them and we could speak to Carpenter from Boston
Consulting Group, and that’s all. It’s a challenge to do due diligence
on a big spread out corporation in one week with that array. So we
did the best we could.
WILLIAM CARNEY: One week seems like an awfully short time
in which to negotiate and to sell a company, and the supreme court
was critical of that timetable.4 Who initiated that timetable?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Van Gorkom, but I think he had a good
reason. I don’t agree with the supreme court on that point, either.
His general logic was this: he was generating tax credits faster than he
could use them, by a lot. So, he could buy a company that had use for
tax credits, he could sell it to a company that had use for tax credits,
or merge. His feeling was that he wouldn’t get more than $55 per
share in any event, and he didn’t want his company kicked around
and auctioned. So, I think the stock was selling—ultimately it was
$37, I believe—

4. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
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WILLIAM CARNEY: I think $37 or $38 was the range that the
court referred to.5
ROBERT PRITZKER: Yes, one or the other. It had been selling
below that, so the premium was pretty great. And, of course, the
proof in the pudding that he was right was later, as you know. It was
put out to bid in an auction and Salomon Brothers had a $5 million
commission riding on it. And in four months they couldn’t top the
bid. So, apparently $55 was the right price to charge us. Now, from
our point of view it didn’t look like such a slam dunk. We had a huge
loan against it, and for the first couple of years I thought we may have
made a mistake. But ultimately it’s worked out fine.
WILLIAM CARNEY: The court was critical of the lockup arrangement that your family had. I believe it turned out to be a
million shares of stock at $38. The supreme court seemed to suggest
that that might have been a deal killer. Was that your view of why
they didn’t come up with any other offers?
ROBERT PRITZKER: I don’t quite see why it would be a deal
killer, but I don’t think that’s the reason. I know this: there was a
management buyout attempt, and it failed because the management
got in a fight with each other. I can’t think of his name—Jack
Kruzenga from Union Tank Car—he’s a very difficult individual—
and he apparently reneged on the whole thing and they couldn’t do it
without him.6 So that took care of the management buyout. Jack
Welch from General Electric looked at it.7 And it would be a natural
for them, just a perfect fit. But for various reasons he turned it down.
So you’ve got some pretty sophisticated people who looked at it.
They had lots of people who took a look, but those two were almost
deals. But I think history has proved that it was a good price.
WILLIAM CARNEY: The other question that has, I think, fascinated many people is the settlement of this case,8 which, I believe, was
for $23 million, and there was, I think, $10 million worth of directors’
and officers’ liability insurance, and your family contributed $11
million—
ROBERT PRITZKER: Thirteen.
5. Id. at 866 n.5 (stating that the high and low range for the common stock of Trans Union
for 1980 through September 19 was $38¼–$29½).
6. For the Delaware Supreme Court’s discussion of Mr. Kruzenga’s involvement, see Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 897 n.1.
7. Jack Welch served as Chairman and CEO of General Electric from 1981–2001.
8. See generally Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom
after Van Gorkum, 41 BUS. LAW. 1 (1985).
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WILLIAM CARNEY: Thirteen? Did you contribute the entire $13
million to the settlement?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Yes.
WILLIAM CARNEY: Could you tell us what motivated you to
make that kind of a contribution?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, we didn’t think the directors had done
anything wrong. They were a very knowledgeable group; as I recall,
four of them were CEOs of conglomerates that had been put together
by buying companies. They surely knew what they were doing.
There was an academic, Allen Wallis, who had been, I think, head of
one of the business schools, either the U of C or Rochester.
WILLIAM CARNEY: Chicago?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Yes, Chicago. And then he ended up the
president or provost or whatever of Rochester University. He was
quite knowledgeable about this. And there was another director who
was in the hospital during this entire transaction. In fact, I’m not sure
I’ve ever met him, but he knew nothing about it. Now, let’s start with
him. For him to pay $1.3 million which he didn’t have would have
bankrupted him. It just didn’t seem quite appropriate. One of the
directors had passed away and his widow was the one who was
supposed to come up with the $1.3 million. It just didn’t seem fair.
As a matter of fact, I think it was $13-and-a-half million, as I recall
now. So we felt that we were the beneficiaries of the whole event.
The directors didn’t do anything wrong, why should they bear the
responsibility? They had nothing to gain and everything to lose. Our
feeling was that morally we owed it to them. So, our deal was we
would pay 90 percent of that $1.35 million for each one, and they
would pay 10 percent to charity. We felt they ought to have
something, but not so gross a number. And, incidentally, Van
Gorkom paid three or four of their charity contributions. He was
about as high class as you could be. He asked for nothing, he didn’t
want any final settlement or bonus. He made one request of us, and
that was that we give him some office space for the Chicago Public
School Finance Authority. A very decent guy—stubborn as hell—but
very honorable.
WILLIAM CARNEY: A question that has come up in that context
is whether the directors had any rights to indemnification from Trans
Union Corporation that would have passed over to you. You don’t
think that that was the case?
ROBERT PRITZKER: I know of none.
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WILLIAM CARNEY: Okay. Anybody on the panel have any
questions? This is our chance to get the last word on this case.
RICHARD PAINTER: It seems to me the court focused in most of
its opinion on the procedural due care that went into the transaction
on the part of the Trans Union directors, rather than the fairness of
the price. Were there aspects of the procedure in the negotiations
that in retrospect perhaps could have been handled in a way that
would have provided more legal cover? The short time between
when the board was notified and when the contract had to be signed
was an issue the court was concerned about;9 it was only a matter of
forty-eight hours.10 Indeed, I think the contract was signed at the
Lyric Opera Ball.11
ROBERT PRITZKER: You know, my memory is not so hot because I wasn’t there. I hate the opera. (Symphony is a different
story, and swing bands altogether different.) The story that I’ve read
was that that was where they happen to have finished the deal. I
thought it’s where it started. But Jay and Jerry Van Gorkom knew
each other from skiing in Vail, and had skied together a lot. And we
were kind of a natural because we could finance it. So he could ask us
the question and get an answer.
A week is too short. Van Gorkom had some ghosts in his closet
that bothered him. Personally, I’d have given more time, but not for
the reason that the supreme court said. I thought he wasn’t fair to his
management, who felt that they had created a lot of this wealth, to
just pull the rug out from under them with two hours’ notice. And
they rebelled. They all wrote the same letter, but the reason for some
of them was that they wanted a management buyout, and for some
they were offended that they weren’t brought into the discussion.
And I can sympathize with them. In fact, a lot of them have become
my very good friends. One continued to work for us until he was
about seventy-six, and then I got sore at him because he retired
(semi)! Terrific guy. But it wouldn’t have made any difference. And,
a week is a short time, but some of these deals drag out for months
and months and months—it’d be better if they were a week. There
9. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
10. See id. at 867, 869 (stating that on September 19, 1980, Jay Pritzker insisted the Trans
Union Board act on his merger proposal within three days; the contract was signed on
September 20).
11. See id. at 869 (stating that Van Gorkom executed the merger agreement “during the
evening of September 20 at a formal social event that he hosted for the opening of the Chicago
Lyric Opera”).
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are operating reasons why faster is better. So, I have kind of mixed
feelings. I hated it because the due diligence was so tough, and
particularly not being able to meet the people. We didn’t know
whether we had a bunch of bums or some really good folks.
RICHARD PAINTER: The business concerns are different from
the legal. Ultimately the transaction from your end was driven by
business concerns. Obviously, from the legal perspective, taking all
the time in the world—dotting your i’s, crossing your t’s, and so
forth—usually gives you more legal protection, like getting a fairness
opinion from Salomon Brothers on the deal or something like that.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, you know, I’m kind of a lawyer by
genetics because my dad, my granddad, my uncles, my brothers, my
nieces and nephews are all lawyers. And I’m an engineer. My dad
and I used to have big discussions. He said, “Bob, you ought to go to
law school because it teaches you how to think.” And I said, “I think
engineering school makes a stab at it occasionally.” And then
whenever there’d be some wacky case, and there sure have been, I’d
turn to him and say, “Is this the logic that I was supposed to learn in
law school and missed?” He became a believer, and he wound up
mad at the legal system. But, sure, I think as an operating person;
sometimes it’s hard for us to figure out how the law is achieving what
its goal is.
JACK JACOBS: Mr. Pritzker, at the time that decision came down
in 1985, I was just another member of the Delaware Bar, and, as such,
an outside observer of those events. All I know about the case is
what I read in the supreme court opinion, which reversed the
chancellor, who had found no liability on the part of the Trans Union
board.12 A key point that the supreme court made was that Mr. Van
Gorkom had not obtained any valuation of the company.13 All that
had been developed, at least as far as the record showed, was a study
by Trans Union’s CFO of the price at which it would be feasible to
acquire the company in a leveraged buyout.14 That study was the
basis for how the $55 price was arrived at.15 My question to you is
whether, in fact, a valuation of the company was ever made?

12. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), rev’g sub nom. Smith v. Pritzker, Del.
Ch. C. A. No. 6342 (July 6, 1982) (Marvel, C.).
13. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876–77.
14. Id. at 877.
15. Id.
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ROBERT PRITZKER: As I understand it, the Boston Consulting
Group tried to make an evaluation.
JACK JACOBS: Was that before or after the deal was signed up, if
you know?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Before. Considerably before.
JACK JACOBS: And was there a number that was arrived at?
ROBERT PRITZKER: It was told to me that it was $55 a share.
Now, we went through individual pieces of it because I was interested
and willing to pay $55. I was at the other end of the telescope. I
wasn’t privy to what they had told Van Gorkom.
JACK JACOBS: But as far as you remember, that was a valuation
that had been made before the merger agreement was signed?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, I know that they had been working for
four months on it. And since we only heard about it a week before I
assume that—but I’m assuming something I don’t know as a fact.
ROBERT SITKOFF: I don’t think anyone wants me to say where I
was or what I was doing when the opinion came out. Instead I’ll just
say that, like the Vice Chancellor, my knowledge of the case comes
from reading the opinion, and the majority opinion rests on the
premise that the one-week timeline came from your family, not from
Van Gorkom.16 According to the opinion, the $55 price, as the Vice
Chancellor just suggested, was the result of splitting the difference
between a pair of back-of-the-envelope feasibility studies.17 The
Boston Consulting Group analysis that you just mentioned was not
discussed in Justice Horsey’s opinion in the context that you just gave
it, and so my guess is that it might not have been presented to the
court in that way. So what you are telling us is that the statement of
the facts in the opinion is wrong about both the source of the oneweek deadline and the origin of the $55 price. Now, both of those
facts were critical to the court’s decision. So, my question is, do you
have a view about the performance of the lawyers? What happened
in the litigation that these facts, which might have changed the
outcome, didn’t come out?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, a couple of things: A week’s notice
was not our idea. It was their idea completely. Can you imagine how
frustrated I was trying to evaluate something where you have one
week, and you’re only privy to three people? And these are hard
16. Id. at 875 (stating that Pritzker imposed the “urgent time constraints”).
17. Id. at 865–66.
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assets—a lot of them were, and some of it was pretty complicated. I
wanted more than a week. A year I didn’t need. Even maybe a
month I didn’t need. But a week? Although, with as little information as we had, a week was probably enough. The other part of
your question was . . .?
ROBERT SITKOFF: Whether you had a comment about the
management of the litigation or the performance of the lawyers since
the source of the one-week timeline and the fact of the Boston
Consulting Group valuation didn’t make it into the majority opinion.
You just said a few moments ago that there was a four-month study
by Van Gorkom’s people. But that didn’t make it into the opinion
either, at least not in the context that you just gave it.
ROBERT PRITZKER: You’re asking me to give an opinion on
whether a lawyer is a good lawyer or a bad lawyer. I know the other
side had a good lawyer! Whether our side had a good lawyer I really
don’t know because I didn’t handle that part of it.
JACK JACOBS: Could I ask one more question? One of the
fascinating aspects of the opinion for those of us who are involved in
corporate governance issues is that Mr. Van Gorkom did not tell his
board or his senior management what he was doing during the time
that he was negotiating with Jay Pritzker. The proposed deal was
presented to the board essentially as a fait accompli, and that created
the senior management rebellion that you were referring to. You
might not know the answer to this question, but I’ll ask it anyway:
Why did he proceed in that manner? Was that his style? Was that
the way public companies were run during that era? Or, is there
some other explanation?
ROBERT PRITZKER: No, I think it would be contrary to the way
they were run, is my impression. I think his feeling was he had these
choices that I mentioned before. He felt that it would not be
economic to buy something that could use the tax credits, so he really
had to sell the company. And if he was going to sell the company, he
reasoned he had several ways to sell it: one was the way he did sell it;
one would be to have an open auction—hire Salomon Brothers to
auction it or hire whatever he wanted. I think he felt that these were
more destructive to the company than picking the price that he
thought it would sell for in the end anyway, which, apparently, it
turned out he was right. In retrospect, he was right. At the time it
didn’t seem that way.
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JACK JACOBS: But he did not consult his board or his senior
management before doing any of this, and my question is: Why?
ROBERT PRITZKER: I wouldn’t have done it that way, if you’re
asking me.
WILLIAM CARNEY: You know, I seem to recall that Justice
McNeilly’s dissent alludes to some long-term studies that had been
done by the Boston Consulting Group.18 It seems to me there was
some allusion to the fact that the board had rather carefully looked at
its options, not in the week preceding the approval of this transaction
but there had been sort of an ongoing conversation about what they
could do. And perhaps Mr. Van Gorkom felt at that time that the
message was fairly clear from his board implicitly if not explicitly. I
guess we’ll never know the answer to that, but at least I think there’s
that possibility that comes out of some of the things that the
dissenting opinion says.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
WILLIAM CARNEY: I’d like to move on. Mr. Pritzker has the
advantage of having sat on the boards of both public and private
corporations, and has seen how boards work in both contexts.
There’s long been a debate about what the boards of public
corporations do, and what kind of time horizons they have, and
whether or not they’re actually focused on maximizing the long-term
value of the company for shareholders, and criticism that maybe they
are myopic in responding to stock price movements. And perhaps
you can give us your general impressions about what role stock prices
and markets play in altering the behavior of directors of public
companies versus directors of private companies. Is there a
difference?
ROBERT PRITZKER: My observation is that there is a difference.
Neither system is very good. But, you know, it’s like democracy: it’s a
terrible system; it’s just the best one we can think of. I think that’s
true of our legal system, too. But the trouble with the public
companies is, I think, obvious. One is that they’re so short-term.

18. Justice McNeilly’s dissent discusses “a comprehensive study of Trans Union made by
The Boston Consulting Group” that Van Gorkom presented to the Trans Union board in
August 1980. According to Justice McNeilly, the study was “prepared over an 18 month period
and consisted of a detailed analysis of all Trans Union subsidiaries, including competitiveness,
profitability, cash throw-off, cash consumption, technical competence and future prospects for
contribution to Trans Union’s combined net income.” Id. at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
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You are dealing with a quarter at a time, and everybody focuses on
the stock price and not the value of the company, which may or may
not be the same. Why something should have three times the
multiple of a company similar to it I’ve never understood. Sometimes
it’s in the name. It’s got the right word in it: “dot-com” at the right
moment meant everything. And you can find a lot of examples of
that. I think public companies are driven by what the security
analysts say. Security analysts are not interested in long-term
activities, and that distorts the governance. That’s one thing.
Secondly, there’s a social problem on the board—and now I’m
getting into the public company problem; I can give you the private
company problem later. It seemed to me Roger Smith should have
been allowed to leave General Motors about ten years before he was
sort of sidelined.19 You didn’t have to be much of an expert to know
that he didn’t know what he was doing. At least that was my opinion.
And yet it took a monumental revolution to do anything because
generally the CEO is the one that appoints the board, and it’s kind of
impolite in American society to chip away at the existing management, and tough to do—tough to know enough to do it. And who are
the board members? There are a few token something-or-others who
have a difficult time leading a group, and then there are businessmen
like the chairman, and they are less apt to do it. So, there’s no system
that we’ve got to coalesce around somebody else. And just socially—
sociologists could have fun with this, as to how boards actually
operate. Am I expressing . . . ?
WILLIAM CARNEY: I think you are. What you’re saying is perfectly consistent, I think, with the famous book Myles Mace wrote
around 1970 about the dynamics of boards of directors, that strong
CEOs dominated the selection process and set the agenda for
meetings, and that by and large these groups were so collegial there
was almost never any challenge, at least in the board meetings.20 If
there were any challenge, it occurred outside the board meeting. As a
result, Mace didn’t think that boards exercised much independence.21
And I think his work was somewhat at the base of a lot of the reforms
that were attempted in the 1970s: requirements by stock exchanges
that there be more outside directors on boards, and that they man

19. Roger Smith was CEO of General Motors from 1981–1990.
20. MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 69 (1971).
21. Id.
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particular committees of the board—compensation committees and
audit committees.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Let me give you an example: Compensation
committees. I was on the board of a reasonably large public
company, and at one point I was chairman of the compensation
committee. And this was a regulated utility, but they also had a large
piece that was unregulated. I thought the management was excellent.
I would’ve hired them and probably paid them more than they were
being paid. So, I had no particular complaint. They would have
McKinsey & Company make a survey of like jobs and present it to us
each year. And I finally went to the chairman one year, and I said,
“Listen, it’s wonderful that you give us what McKinsey has to say, but
you tell them what to look for. You’re the one paying their fee. This
is not what I would call an ‘independent analysis.’ Why don’t you
give my committee the money and let us go out and hire somebody to
do it, and give them the specifications.” I said, “To be honest with
you, I think you can get a raise in pay as a result, but it just seems to
me fairer to the rate payers and to the shareholders if you did it that
way.” And he actually agreed with me. But when we put up to the
board, it was turned down. And why? Because a lot of these guys
were themselves CEOs, and they didn’t think this was such a cool
idea.
Now, private companies have a different problem, and that’s the
interplay of families. You’ve got siblings, one is CEO and one isn’t.
The one that isn’t isn’t happy. He may be more competent and he
may be less competent. He may be incompetent. But he still wants
what he wants, and the dynamics of families are very complicated.
JACK JACOBS: If I may, I would like to footnote a comment that
[William Carney] made, and also ask a question for the panel. I think
we have come a long way since the 1970 study that you referred to. It
is true that we started in the ‘50s and ‘60s with the strong-CEO–
passive-board model. But after Van Gorkom, we have observed
significant changes from that model at this point for a variety of
reasons. One of those reasons, in my opinion, is the Van Gorkom
decision itself, which in the view of some is more of a symbol than a
substantive change-agent. A second reason for the emergence of a
more “proactive” board governance model can be attributed to the
corporate governance reforms that have been referred to, including
the recommendation to create audit committees and other types of
formal structures. Third, and I think most important, is the activist
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institutional investor movement. All of these have been forces in the
direction of creating more independent, proactive, boards. Despite
that, however, boards and managements have, as you said, a very
short-term emphasis on current stock price that, in turn, is causing a
short-term emphasis on the way many public companies are being
governed, and a corresponding de-emphasis on long-term planning.
Many have argued this de-emphasis on long-term planning is not
good for the economy. My question is, is there any way to reverse
that practice, other than by overhauling the compensation structure
of senior managements in public companies by making that structure
less dependent on stock market price performance?
WILLIAM CARNEY: I’ll jump in on that one. I make this comment in my law school class from time to time: I say that business
schools did a terrible job of educating their students about the role of
markets and stock market pricing and market efficiency for a very
long time. Thus, it seems that all too few senior executives believe
that market prices are really sending very important signals or that
markets are very well informed. And I say that in the context of a lot
of criticism that there’s probably insufficient R&D [(research and
development)] because R&D doesn’t drop immediately to the bottom
line, and you take a stock price hit. Except the empirical studies say
otherwise: the empirical studies say that R&D does get valued to the
extent that we can make any kind of an informed prediction that it
will create value. There are studies out there that say, “Yes, the
markets do appreciate a long-term perspective and they appropriately
discount to present value the entire expected stream of future
earnings.”22 There are, of course, information asymmetries from time
to time, but there’s no reason to believe they’re systematic. And,
therefore, I’ve always wondered about business executives. I’ll give
you another example: purchase versus pooling accounting.23 In a
rational world, purchase accounting lowers taxes (it also happens to
lower stated earnings but it raises cash flows) where pooling
accounting raises stated earnings and raises taxes. And yet for a very
long time corporate executives have desperately sought pooling
22. Su Han Chan et al., Corporate Research and Development Expenditures and Share
Value, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 255 (1990); John J. McConnell & Chris J. Muscarella, Corporate Capital
Expenditure Decisions and the Market Value of the Firm, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 399 (1985); see also
Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
119, 144–45 (1992).
23. For a discussion of accounting principles, including “purchase” and “pooling” forms of
accounting, see Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for
“Dirty Pooling” and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141 (1997).
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accounting. Claire Hill has written about this in the past,24 and very
thoughtfully. But it seems to me that there is some evidence here of a
terrible market failure in the market for managers who don’t get it:
taxes are bad, cash flow is good. How can this be?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Because stock prices are so important.
ROBERT SITKOFF: There was a related debate a few years ago
regarding the accounting treatment of option-based executive
compensation.25 Putting to one side transaction costs—the costs of
having analysts decipher idiosyncratic forms of reporting—the form
in which these compensation packages are reported shouldn’t matter
in an efficient market. Anyway, Bill’s earlier point raises a very
important question: Why do we believe that a focus on the short-term
stock price deflects us from seeking long-term value? Why can’t the
market discount to present value the benefit of investment in the
future and adjust the current market price accordingly? Why is it if
you announce, “We have a sound long-term strategy that in ten years
will generate huge returns,” why can’t the market accurately discount
that? Or more to the point, why do managers believe that the market
can’t process this long-term data so that they feel a need to focus on
short-term gains at the expense of what might be a more profitable
long-term investment?
JACK JACOBS: Do you have an answer for that?
ROBERT SITKOFF: Well, I’m just starting.
RICHARD PAINTER: Let’s ask Mr. Pritzker. How confident do
you feel in the ability of the markets to value companies as long-term
investments?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, I’m not surprised to find that the
stocks on the NASDAQ are worth half as much now, or less than
half, as they were a year-and-a-half ago. Maybe they are. They are
worth less because people won’t pay as much for it and the market is
right in that sense. But I can’t believe that the fundamental company
is that different.
There are a couple of problems with public companies in general—the accounting, for example. The SEC correctly says, “We
want this stuff to be comparable.” A person goes to his broker and
evaluates one company compared to another, he can choose anything
he wants, and he chooses what he thinks is going to be the best return.
24. See id.
25. For a general overview of this debate, see Calvin H. Johnson, Accounting and Taxation:
Accounting in Favor of Investors, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 637, 643–49 (1997).
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So, the SEC pushes the FASB [(Financial Accounting Standards
Board)] to have everything the same. And my analogy is, it would be
like the NCAA having one set of rules for all sports. I mean, the
accounting for a financial institution is very different from that of a
foundry. But they use the same chart of accounts, basically. In our
company, we must have a hundred charts of accounts, and we
wouldn’t consolidate a full P&L [(profit and loss)] statement. The
sales you can consolidate and the profits you can consolidate.
Everything else in the middle doesn’t mean anything. To add the cost
of goods sold of a pharmaceutical product to the cost of goods sold of
a foundry product, I don’t know what you’d get, but it isn’t a very
good pill.
RICHARD PAINTER: So, in the end the markets are quite inefficient, I gather. You’re suggesting that is in part because the
information given to the markets is difficult to understand and
perhaps incongruent with the reality of how these businesses are run.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, also, you’ve given such a gigantic
incentive to the management to be optimistic. You know, what
period should you take to write off goodwill? Now I guess they’re not
going to write it off at all. We do it in five years; you could say ours is
too fast. It’s very subjective.
RICHARD PAINTER: Do you think stock options given to management increase that incentive?
ROBERT PRITZKER: No. But, interesting—I’ve been waiting for
this to happen and it did yesterday or today. One of the unions made
a big fuss about the pay of some of these senior executives. And
when you see somebody who’s fired because he did such a lousy job
and he picks up $10 million in severance pay and stock options it
makes the working stiff a little upset, and I don’t understand it either.
JACK JACOBS: But isn’t that part of the problem with our system
for executive recruitment? I mean, I have been told that unless you
can promise executives who are being asked to come on board that
they will receive exactly this kind of protection, you will have
difficulty recruiting them. Yet, if those executives do a lousy job they
still wind up receiving a $2 million severance package.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Yes, that’s true. But the way these numbers
came about was that many, many years ago [someone] with the
HayGroup came up with this idea of, we’ll make a survey and we’ll
give our guy 5 percent more than the survey. And then the other
person surveys it and now you’ve got 5 percent more, and it works
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like magic. There’s no question that the quality of the CEO has an
enormous impact on the company. But it’s also the staff. In the end,
the people are everything.
ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE CAREMARK DECISION
WILLIAM CARNEY: Let me move on a bit. It seems to me that
there’s some indication the job of being a director of a public
company has grown more difficult in recent years, that the responsibilities of directors to monitor and supervise the operations of the
firm seem to have risen. The Caremark decision in the Delaware
court,26 in what I think is just dicta, suggests a duty to monitor for law
violations, at least in some contexts.27 And the notion of monitoring
duties has been batted around for the last twenty-five years, and I
think has attained increasing acceptance. My sense is that directors
are sitting on fewer boards today than they did a few years ago
because of the higher expectations on directors. And I’m curious
about what do you think motivates people to sit on boards of public
companies, given the fact that the burdens seem to be increasing and
the liabilities, at least in some cases, have increased.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Speaking for myself, I won’t do it.
WILLIAM CARNEY: Well, what about “those other people”?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, several things: One is the pay of directors has grown dramatically. You can make a lot of money being on a
board. Secondly, there’s a certain amount of prestige. Third, if you
have the time there’s a certain amount of fun, depending on the
company. I always thought I’d want to be on an airline’s board, but
I’m not sure now. But you get to see things and do things that you
wouldn’t otherwise. And networking. I guess those would be the
reasons.
WILLIAM CARNEY: Any questions?
ROBERT SITKOFF: I would like to ask a question that resonates
with a comment that Bill made earlier. Do you have a view on
reputational constraints on members of the board? Just a moment
ago we were talking about the structural bias thesis—the idea that
members of the board are going to be biased towards management
decisions because they were probably picked by the CEO and are
often executives in other corporations themselves. Yet today we say
26. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
27. Id.
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that we need independent compensation committees and we need
special litigation committees to decide whether to allow derivative
litigation to proceed. One of the justifications for deferring to these
“independent” subcommittees, such as the special litigation
committee, is that the selection of and the decisions made by the
members of those committees are checked by reputational constraints. If you have a reputation for always rubber-stamping
compensation patterns or for always short-circuiting derivative
litigation, then maybe that will make you less likely to be chosen for
board membership in the first place because of the signal that your
nomination would send to the market. So, my question is, when you
say people agree to board membership for the glory or the money or
the networking opportunities, do you think that there is a legitimate
reputational check operating in the background?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, it’s very hard. My family is the owner
of our company. And I’m very serious about complying with laws
and being proper, and I have a hell of a time keeping up with it. We
have said over and over and over to our people, “You can’t pay off,
you can’t sell to places that we’re not supposed to sell to.” Every year
when they get a raise (or every decade—we try to keep costs low!) I
make them sign a statement that they haven’t done that. Now, with
all of that, every couple of years I uncover one—you know, “How did
that one get by us?” And, well, the FBI can’t manage to keep straight
their people, and we’re not the FBI. But you know, we really are
careful about adhering to both the law and what we think is proper
behavior. But from time to time I find our people misbehaving.
RICHARD PAINTER: Let me ask you a question about what you
expect from your lawyers if you are the director of a corporation.
With the Caremark decision, even though much of it is dicta, there’s
certainly the fear of liability on the part of directors for not having
detected illegal activity. If you are a director of a corporation, do you
expect the lawyers for the company, if they know of illegal acts that
they’ve reported to management, and if management won’t do
anything about it, to make a report to the board, including the
independent directors, of what’s going on?
ROBERT PRITZKER: I don’t know how you really achieve it. I
mean, yes, you can say, “I want a report,” and be sure that’s in the
record and so on. You can leave a trail. Unless all the board
members are attorneys they’re not going to be too sensitive to some
of this stuff. And asking management to do it is tough. Say, for
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instance, you’re buying shoes in China and you say you don’t want
any child labor. How do you know if there’s child labor there? How
do you know about the guy who sells you the shoelaces? Who checks
him? And how you check him? There are some practical aspects.
I’m for the idea, but I’m not sure how you do it.
RICHARD PAINTER: Let’s say outside counsel of the company
learned there was a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in
connection with that branch in China. Would you expect them to tell
the board that if they were unable to persuade management to
correct the violation?
ROBERT PRITZKER: I would expect them to, but I also would be
surprised if they do. I don’t know if that’s a fair answer.
WILLIAM CARNEY: Let me push the lawyer question a little
further because you’re among us.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Yes, that’s what I’m nervous about!
WILLIAM CARNEY: At board meetings, do you expect to have
counsel present and playing an active role in advising the board about
legal issues and pointing out pitfalls?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Yes. But I also know that attorneys have a
problem. You have a client—who is your client in this case?
WILLIAM CARNEY: I know the legal answer to that. The legal
answer is the corporation. Many people say as a practical matter it’s
the CEO.
ROBERT PRITZKER: As a practical matter it is. And what is the
corporation?
WILLIAM CARNEY: Well, presumably the board is the highest
authority within the corporation, and thus the board represents the
corporation for all these purposes.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Yes. Well, realistically, I think most inhouse counsels or outside counsels feel that the management is their
client, partly for practical reasons—well, for all practical reasons.
Some of it’s the economics of the thing, and some of it’s just the
practical aspect. You talk to the CEO all the time; you don’t talk to
the directors. You know the CEO understands the problem, and
you’re not sure whether the director does.
RICHARD PAINTER: But is that, perhaps, something that should
be rectified? In other words, perhaps boards could try to communicate more often with counsel, ask for reports from counsel, have more
lawyers in board meetings, and make it clear to counsel what they
expect in terms of information?
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ROBERT PRITZKER: Yes, but if you run the company on a totally
legal basis you won’t make your product.
JACK JACOBS: I was about to observe that the problems we have
been talking about during the last ten minutes really may loosely be
described as outgrowths of the Caremark issue. That is, to what
extent does our legal system impose a duty on directors of public
companies to assure that the company is in compliance with all
applicable laws that pertain to the company’s business? The
Caremark case is really the first Delaware decision that we’ve had on
that issue since the Allis-Chalmers case,28 which was decided in the
1960s.
There are really two layers of difficulty, putting aside for the
moment the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet
spoken on this issue. One, which Mr. Pritzker alluded to, is how, in
the real world, do we craft a system that can give the board any
guarantee that the company’s lower level employees are not violating
the antitrust laws, the environmental laws, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, and whatever other laws to which their company may
be subject, and which if violated could expose the company to
significant liability? We don’t have a good answer for that, except to
say that the problem may be more a management issue than a
lawyer’s issue. That is, the lawyer’s task is to guide the management
in attempting—and here I am using the words of the opinion—in
“good faith” to put into place a system designed to assure that the
board receives the necessary flow of information.29 The actual design
and implementation, however, is for the managers. The reason I
express it in those words is that, as we all are aware, there is no
practical way that boards of public companies can micromanage at
the grassroots level what all of the divisions of the company are or are
not doing in terms of legal compliance. That is not the way our
system works. The only practical alternative is a reporting system,
created by the managers, that operates so that the relevant information flows up to the board level. That presents one set of issues
with which as of yet we have little experience. Perhaps some
guidance will come from academics like Professor [John] Coates [at
Harvard Law School], who will do empirical studies on that issue and
educate us about whether these information systems are effective.

28. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
29. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968–70.
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A more serious level of issue that is potentially implicated is
what happens if management at the most senior level is involved in
law breaking? Then you have not just a Caremark problem but also a
host of other problems affecting both inside and outside counsel. In
this context, how, realistically, do we expect inside counsel, who may
have a legal and ethical obligation to report such wrongdoing to the
board, to do so where “doing the right thing” may cost them their
careers? Here again, I think we need to find a way to develop
practical solutions.
ROBERT SITKOFF: I would add that there is a related question
about federalism in corporate law lurking in the background. It is
unclear whether this duty to monitor is an independent, freestanding
duty or if instead it is an outgrowth of the duty of care. Because
much of the regulatory overlay with which corporate compliance
regimes must deal is federal, and because the federal sentencing
guidelines sometimes treat the existence of compliance systems as a
mitigating factor, this could, in effect, represent a federal imposition
of content to the duty of care. This imposition may be a good thing,
or it may not. My point is that it takes the issue out of the competition between the states.30
JACK JACOBS: Just one response to that. I don’t disagree with
any of what you said except that at the state level it is not even clear
that the duty to monitor is an outgrowth of the duty of care. If the
“good faith” language in the Caremark opinion is taken seriously,
then one could as easily argue that the monitoring duty is an
outgrowth of the duty of loyalty. That is one of the issues that needs
to be clarified in a future case.
WILLIAM CARNEY: In that context, back in the 1970s in the postWatergate era, Arthur Goldberg proposed that a special committee, a
monitoring committee of the board, should be set up that had its own
staff and its own ability to investigate and to serve as an employee
hotline.31 That proposal essentially went nowhere. And after passage
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,32 the SEC began a rulemaking
30. For seminal works on the question of federalism and corporate law, see William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974);
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913 (1982); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225
(1985).
31. Arthur J. Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3, at 1.
32. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
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proceeding to promulgate some rules about how one could appropriately monitor for illegal foreign payments. And that came up as a
dry hole.33 They were unable to come up with any scheme that would
describe an appropriate monitoring system. And I think that
probably gets at the real difficulty of this area: describing a system
that would work.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Could I answer a question nobody asked?
WILLIAM CARNEY: Yes sir.
ROBERT PRITZKER: One thing bewilders me. Take taxes as an
example. We go back to about 1976, I think—not 1776, but 1976—in
our open tax years. That’s because the IRS wants to waive the statute
of limitations which you’re forced to give. (I know it’s voluntary, but
try not giving it.) My guess is, if you took all the states that we’re
dealing with—and a lot of their taxes are dependent on the IRS—and
all the years we’re talking about, you’d fill more than half of this
room with paper if you just took the code, the cases that are
important, and the regulations. And that’s just taxes. Now let’s move
on to people, which is much worse. You’d fill up the entire room.
And we have factories that have thirty people in them for maintenance kinds of things. Who can keep track of all this stuff? The labor
ones are probably the worst. And how do you define something like
harassment? It’s very subjective. Or even diversity—it’s not easy to
define some of these categories. My wife is Eurasian; she never
knows what to put down. Somehow or other you can’t just keep
making rules and solutions to problems with rules. It’s got to be a
legitimate defense that you just didn’t know about it. You folks are
all attorneys—I’ll bet you I can dig up plenty of questions you can’t
answer by regulations. Now consider somebody who is basically a
machinist: how is that person going to do it?

amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (2001)).
33. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 716 n.119 (observing that “[i]n 1979,
the SEC proposed that management disclose its opinion of whether internal accounting controls
provide reasonable assurance that specified objectives were met, and describe any material
weaknesses of such controls that independent accountants communicated to management”;
citing the Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,772, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 82,063 (April 30, 1979)). The SEC forewent that approach, however, and instead
determined on a case-by-case ex post basis how much monitoring was insufficient. Id. (citing
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,877, 557, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at H-1
(June 11, 1980). See also William J. Carney, Section 4.01 of the American Law Institute
Corporate Governance Project: Restate or Misstate?, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 239, 262 (1988).
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MORE ON VAN GORKOM
QUESTIONER ONE: I’d like to push a little harder on the Trans
Union case. I know where I was when the transaction happened; I
was working in the tax department of a law firm. And, if I remember
correctly, at that point in time the tax credits that you alluded to were
actually quite precarious politically, and the potential value of them
hinged on a lot of things like how public they became, and how many
people in Washington found out about them and how quickly, and the
scope of the magnitude of the transactions using the credits. Now, if
my memory is right, can you help me with whether or not they really
were a big part of the value and whether they really were precarious?
And if that’s right, what happened that if you read the Delaware
Supreme Court’s opinion you have absolutely no sense that has
anything to do with what the transaction was about? What
happened? Was it not there? Did the lawyers not argue it? Did the
lawyers argue it and the court ignored it?
ROBERT PRITZKER: I have no idea what the court thought. But
we did use the tax credits and saved money with it.
QUESTIONER ONE: Oh, I forgot the years are still open, so
maybe you can’t talk about it.
ROBERT PRITZKER: No, I think on that they’re closed. But years
are open from before then. You’re absolutely right. It could have
been. But I believe that’s been settled.
RICHARD PAINTER: It appeared to me from the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion that it was a tax-driven transaction, that the
tax credits were really only worth something if Trans Union merged
with another company that had some taxes to pay to use the credits
against.34
ROBERT SITKOFF: Although, if the tax credits were precarious
because they were vulnerable to congressional action, that would be a
good reason for Van Gorkom to want a one-week window. It also
might explain the absence of this point from the opinion, since
arguing it would give the tax credits public attention. The opinion, as
I said earlier, suggested that the time frame came from the Pritzker
family.
ROBERT PRITZKER: And that wasn’t the case.

34. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864–65 (Del. 1985).
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ROBERT SITKOFF: This is something that, to my knowledge, has
not been explored.
RICHARD PAINTER: Well, the opinion said that Van Gorkom
was going to Washington to lobby—or somebody, I think it was Van
Gorkom—was going to Washington to lobby for a bill that would
allow Trans Union to use tax credits anyway even though it didn’t
owe any tax and that that proposal was unsuccessful.35
ROBERT PRITZKER: I believe that’s true, but that’s sort of
hearsay.
ROBERT SITKOFF: If the credits were precarious, then you can
imagine why no one would want a bidding war. A bidding war might
alert everyone to the existence of the credits, something you’d want
to avoid if they were politically precarious.
QUESTIONER ONE: Well, people knew that there were tax benefits involved, but they might not have known how big they could be in
the right hands. I can’t remember what the time span was, but he
might well have thought that more time would have jeopardized the
tax benefits.
QUESTIONER TWO: I’ve got a question. I was of counsel to the
Texas law firm that represented Alden Smith,36 although it was
shortly after all this happened. And one of the lores of the case was
that the court was inclined to take it more seriously because Alden
Smith was actually a very substantial shareholder. He wasn’t one of
these people—I shouldn’t name any names, but I know a few of
them—who own one hundred or two hundred shares. He had a lot of
shares, and apparently he was quite annoyed with the deal. I’ve never
met him, and I’m curious what kind of person he was. I don’t know if
you ever met him.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, you know what Smith’s problem was?
His basis for his shares was very low. He had merged a company into
Trans Union and had gotten many shares. That’s how he got them.
And the basis apparently was very low, and in our transaction we
triggered the tax. That wasn’t our intention, but that’s the way it
panned out. So, he had a legitimate reason for doing it. I don’t cast
aspersions—he’s a nice guy.
QUESTIONER TWO: That was mostly what I wanted to know.

35. Id.
36. Alden Smith was a Trans Union shareholder and named plaintiff in the class action suit
brought against the Trans Union Board of Directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom. 488 A.2d at 864.
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CORPORATE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
WILLIAM CARNEY: I have one more question on the public
directors issue. This is really two issues that sort of converge on
corporate contributions: one is corporate contributions to charities,
and the other is corporate political contributions.37 Warren Buffett’s
remarks come to mind, that he had a friend who was a fundraiser who
raised funds from corporations for some charity.38 He would go in
and he would raise a lot of money from CEOs using stockholders’
money, but never did he see a CEO reach in his pocket for his own
checkbook and write a check for ten dollars.39 Somehow, it’s much
easier to spend money when it’s not your own and to be some kind of
a local hero. Is that consistent with your view of what happens in
public companies? Or, is charitable giving constrained in any way by
boards?
ROBERT PRITZKER: I sort of feel your first comment. If the
contribution has some value to the company, I can see it. But if it’s
just a straightforward charitable contribution, it seems to me that the
shareholder can make his own decision. He doesn’t need the
corporation to do it for him. If that’s a charity he wants to give to, he
can do it.
WILLIAM CARNEY: Do you observe that kind of giving in corporations where you’ve sat on their boards?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, the one that was a public utility had
some argument. But the question there was not only the shareholder,
but the rate payer—should that be a deduction when he calculates his
taxes? It’s a very tricky question. I’m not sure how I felt about that
because there was an argument from a business point of view that you
should spend it. There’s charity that has business value and there’s
charity that’s honest-to-God charity.

37. For a discussion of corporate charitable contributions, see Henry N. Butler & Fred S.
McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in
the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195 (1999). For a discussion
of corporate political contributions, see Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political
Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
summer 2002).
38. Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion, in KNIGHTS,
RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 14 (John C. Coffee et al.
eds., 1988) (remarks by Warren Buffett).
39. Id.
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RICHARD PAINTER: How about political contributions? With
this dispute over whether unions ought to be taking their members’
money—
ROBERT PRITZKER: I was going to say, if everybody will “1-2-3
stop!” I’m for it.
RICHARD PAINTER: But do you really see value for the corporation? I guess there is value from these political contributions, but
then the unions are just dumping in money on the other side. So I
guess it’s a wash.
ROBERT PRITZKER: But is it a wash?
RULES VERSUS STANDARDS
QUESTIONER THREE: Mr. Pritzker, you rightly point out that
laws can fill rooms when the lawyers try to write down everything,
every possible rule, and try to get very detailed. The tax code is very
detailed, lots of regulations. On the other hand, when you don’t do
that you get cases like Van Gorkom. And I would offer the following
suggestion: the Van Gorkom case is a bad case, maybe, evaluated on
its own merits. But you’re going to get bad cases from time to time
when you don’t have a very detailed set of rules and regulations to
tell courts how to come out on a given set of facts. You’re going to
get lawyers manipulating, doing a good job. You’re going get
management who is unhappy with what their CEO did and maybe
spin the facts a little bit in a way that they might not otherwise do. I
mean, it’s all about choice: you’ve got the choice between going
forward with rules to follow or occasional cases that just are crazy.
What’s your preference?
ROBERT PRITZKER: Yes. I haven’t thought about it as much in
case law as I have in regulation, because we have thousands of people
that we spend a fortune paying every day to write regulations that I
think on average are not worth doing. There’s no way; you can’t win.
The FDA drives you crazy. I’ve dealt with them. And yet, if you said
to me, “Would you not have an FDA?” I’d have an FDA. A crazier
example is the EPA. I started an Environmental Engineering
Department at IIT [(Illinois Institute of Technology)] in 1965, before
there was an EPA, before there was an Earth Day. I was very active
in antipollution. So, I feel I have the credits. But the EPA is crazy.
Most of the money goes to the legal profession (I shouldn’t say that in
here), and to testers and writers of reports. Most of it is not used for
cleanup, and about half the cleanup we do is silly. So, I think you
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need to have a cost-benefit analysis. I don’t think the government
needs to be more efficient, they just need fewer things to do. I would
eliminate departments. And that’s true: there will be bad things that
happen. You’re not going to have a perfect system, whatever it is.
But the economics are so lopsided that you could go so far as
bankrupting the economy and starving people. There must be a
better way to use that money.
ROBERT SITKOFF: This is not a question about corporate governance in particular. This is a more general question about the
nature of legal regulation, of rules versus standards, right?
QUESTIONER THREE: That’s right.
ROBERT SITKOFF: Sure, rules are over- and underinclusive but
they have lower administrative costs. Standards are more contextual
but that means they’ll have higher decision costs. An important
factor in choosing rules or standards is how much you trust the
decision maker. No sensible person thinks rules are always better
than standards or standards are always better than rules. The
problem is figuring out which is better when, which way the analysis
tips in a given context.
RICHARD PAINTER: You know, that carries over in a lot of areas
of law. In the securities area, I cannot go on about how awful I think
the case law is under Section 10b, Rule 10b5, which I really put under
the standards end of the spectrum. And yet how many cases do you
see under Section 5 of the ‘33 Act40 over whether someone should
have filed a registration statement or not? I mean, there the SEC
rules are quite detailed, and yet people complain ad nauseam about
the ‘33 Act and the rules thereunder and the cost of hiring lawyers to
comply with them. But perhaps that may be more efficient and less
expensive than hiring lawyers to litigate over these questions after the
fact.
WILLIAM CARNEY: It’s always more efficient to hire transactional lawyers than litigators.
RICHARD PAINTER: Having been a transactional lawyer, I think
I tend to agree with that.
ROBERT PRITZKER: You know, it was always surprising to me
(again, I am saying this as a non-attorney). We had a transaction that
we made before Trans Union, called Cerro Corporation, and it was a
very complex transaction because of the tax aims that we had. We
40. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2001).
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sent out an S-14 registration form. It was 180 pages, and it was really
esoteric law and accounting. I think our auditor was one of the best
accountants I’ve ever heard of and he spent three months fussing
around with it himself personally. It was terribly complex. We
mailed it out on a Monday morning at nine o’clock, and by ten
o’clock there were five lawsuits. Now, either they were very rapid
readers and very good at interpreting or they had those complaints
made out before they ever saw the thing.
RICHARD PAINTER: I think the latter is the case. I know it.
They had the complaints ready to go.
ROBERT PRITZKER: Well, sure they did.
JACK JACOBS: Well, as a former litigator I feel compelled to
make one response to Professor Carney, and that is that while it may
be the case that transactional lawyers add more value, if we killed all
the litigators we would have to reinvent them very quickly.
ROBERT PRITZKER: I’d like to try, though!
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
WILLIAM CARNEY: Let’s turn, if I may, from corporate management questions to questions of corporate law. And since we have
Vice Chancellor Jacobs with us here it’s a chance to at least discuss
some topics of fairly broad interest in Delaware law. Vice Chancellor
Jacobs has raised the question of whether Delaware has developed
multiple standards of care for directors in making business judgments.
Aronson v. Lewis, on the one hand, says the standard of review is
gross negligence.41 Of course, every lawyer knows that the difference
between ordinary negligence and gross is simply the addition of one
word to that phrase; it doesn’t really inform us much about the real
standards of review. But on the other hand, we’ve got cases like
Smith v. Van Gorkom and Cede v. Technicolor42 where the court in
arm’s-length business transactions has engaged in a much closer
review of board action and concluded that in these cases the boards
have been deficient in their information processing function, and that

41. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
42. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d
956 (Del. 1994) (stating that “a director’s duty of care requires a director to take an active and
direct role in the . . . sale of a company from beginning to end,” and “directors individually and
the board collectively . . . [must] inform themselves fully and in a deliberate manner before
voting as a board upon a transaction as significant as a proposed merger or sale of the
company”); see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858.
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we’ve really got two standards. And I guess the broader question is
whether or not this creates confusion, perhaps for Vice Chancellors,
but also for lawyers advising clients and for corporate executives in
making decisions, and what implications does it have for those
decisions?
JACK JACOBS: That is really a corporate lawyers’ and judges’
problem, so I guess Mr. Pritzker is off the hook. (He is free,
nonetheless, to chime in any time he likes.) Earlier today we heard
from a number of very distinguished panelists, including Professor
Letsou, who spoke about the rationale for the business judgment
rule.43 This question ties directly into that issue. We have an
articulated standard of review, which is gross negligence. That is
what the courts say that a plaintiff must show before a board will be
held liable for money damages, assuming that there is no exculpatory
clause in the corporation’s charter. But one of the problems with the
Van Gorkom and Cede v. Technicolor decisions is that the court
seems to be articulating one liability standard but in fact applying
another. That is, one can read those opinions as in fact applying an
ordinary negligence, rather than a gross negligence, standard. If that
is correct, then you confront the business judgment rule issues that
44
Professor Letsou was talking about directly and Professor Frankel
indirectly.45 If boards can be held liable in damages for making a
decision that was reasonable at the time but that turned out to be
wrong—which as a matter of probability will happen in a certain
number of cases—then you will make boards of directors risk averse.
That is, you will create disincentives for directors to take the kinds of
entrepreneurial risks that we want to encourage boards to take. I
come down on the side of avoiding risk aversion as a primary policy
that the business judgment standard is designed to further. And for
that reason, I contend, it is dysfunctional to have a disconnect in cases
that say that directors will not be held liable unless the plaintiff
demonstrates a very high threshold of bad conduct, that is, gross
negligence, while at the same time in fact applying a lower standard,
that is, ordinary negligence. That is the concern.
RICHARD PAINTER: Also, when you apply negligence standards
to questions of fact, you often find what the law and psychology
43. See Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and
Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179 (2001).
44. Id.
45. Tamar Frankel, Of Theory and Practice, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 5 (2001).

262

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 77:235

scholars refer to as hindsight bias: looking at unfortunate events that
occurred in the past and overestimating the likelihood that they
would have occurred beforehand. The fact finder thus says, “You
should have known that this was going to happen,” finding, in effect,
that the actors’—the managers’ and directors’—conduct was not up to
the standard of care when indeed it was. This hindsight bias that is
imposed on the fact finder’s interpretation of facts thus compounds
whatever problems there are with the legal standard to begin with.
JACK JACOBS: Right. Or, to put it in maybe more plain terms:
There’s a difference between a reasonable board decision that turned
out to be wrong and an unreasonable board decision. Professor
Frankel referred to the doctor who did a wonderful job in the
operation but the patient died and the lawyer who did a superb job
but lost the case.46 Well, in many cases directors can do a superb job
in making a business decision and it just turns out to be on the wrong
side; it’s a risk, and part of the risk is that it will not work out and that
often happens. If you have an ordinary negligence standard, you run
the institutional risk that the court can too easily confuse a good
decision that turned out badly with a decision that was bad to begin
with, i.e., negligent. And so that is one of the reasons why we have an
articulated standard of review or liability that is gross negligence
rather than negligence.
WILLIAM CARNEY: Is it a valid distinction to note that the two
cases that we’ve talked about are cases charging that the board didn’t
have enough information to make an informed judgment, which is
different from making a mistaken judgment?
JACK JACOBS: Well, both cases arose in the context of the sale of
the company. In both cases the court spoke of the duty and
responsibilities of the target company board, in terms of seeing to it
that the shareholders’ interests are properly protected when the
company is being sold. In Cede v. Technicolor, the supreme court
emphasized the need for vigilance, using language that suggests an
affirmative duty to be highly proactive.47 I have no quarrel with that
approach; it is laudable. My point, however, is that the Cede language
does not describe a standard of gross negligence. Rather, it sounds
more like a standard of ordinary negligence. Obviously, that is a
matter of interpretation, but I think that Cede exemplifies the
disconnect I have referred to, which creates confusion and also
46. Id. at 19–20.
47. Cede, 634 A.2d at 368.
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concern on the part of board counselors who are called upon to give
advice, based on these decisions, about what is the true standard of
liability.
WILLIAM CARNEY: One effect of a decision like Trans Union, I
think, was that it was really the “Investment Bankers Civil Relief Act
of 1985.” Nobody’s going to do a transaction without a fairness
opinion any more, and fairness opinions can be cranked out virtually
overnight if necessary. The year following Trans Union I was
involved in a matter where the officers got a call from their
investment bankers on Thursday saying, “Come from Atlanta to New
York on Friday. We’ve got some folks who are interested in making
you an offer.” They made a jaw-dropping offer. It was sixty-two
times trailing earnings. These folks wouldn’t have had the temerity to
ask for that price. Once it was offered, the only thing they wanted to
say was “yes.” How quickly can they say “yes”? Well, they called the
board meeting for Sunday afternoon. Salomon was capable of
putting together a full fairness opinion booklet with all the tabs and
all the information to hopefully delude a judge into believing that this
was an informed decision. And it was presented to the board, and the
board was sitting there and saying, “When can we vote ‘yes’?” They
had no questions of Salomon, so the man from Salomon simply asked
himself some questions to make the record. He said, “I suppose
you’re asking, would my opinion be the same if I had more time.” He
said, “Yes it would.” So, now we’ve cleared up that part of the record
about whether this is too rushed. I mean, this man was a good lawyer
for an investment banker. He had read the Trans Union opinion;
he’d been fully advised. And so now we’ve got people who skillfully
know how to paper the record to provide cover for the directors.
RICHARD PAINTER: Weinberger v. UOP?48
ROBERT SITKOFF: Wasn’t it in the Weinberger case where the
investment banking opinion was written out—completely prepared—
and only the price was left blank to be filled in later on?
RICHARD PAINTER: Yes, the Lehman Brothers guy was up on
the ski slopes in Vermont. He flew out to Iowa with the price blank.
He must have thought about it on the ski slopes and returned for his
half—I believe it was half-a-million dollars compensation.
WILLIAM CARNEY: No, I think he had his young associates back
in the office all weekend cranking out the numbers. I mean,
48. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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somebody’s doing that job. But is the Trans Union and Cede rule
more than that? Or, does it just require everybody to hire an
investment banker and give a fairness opinion?
JACK JACOBS: As Golda Meir once said, I don’t respond to
questions phrased that way.
WILLIAM CARNEY: It was a rhetorical question.
JACK JACOBS: I know. Interestingly enough, in Van Gorkom,
the supreme court expressly said they were not holding that a fairness
opinion is required in every merger transaction.49 But as Professor
Carney and others have pointed out, the corporate bar seems to have
ignored, or chosen not to believe, the supreme court’s disclaimer.
Perhaps because of the culture and/or financial incentives that drive
many law firms and investment banks, the practice has been to obtain
a fairness opinion. And this is the case despite the post–Van Gorkom
case law, which has made it clear that there is more than one way that
boards can demonstrate that they have sufficient knowledge of the
value of the company to make an informed decision. A fairness
opinion is only one of those ways. For better or worse, the inertia of
the custom of obtaining an investment bank fairness opinion has
carried more weight than the language of the opinions that recognize
and allow other options.
RICHARD PAINTER: But when you’re up against unpredictable
legal standards plus hindsight bias, aren’t you better off with it than
without it if you get sued?
JACK JACOBS: Are you better off with it than without it? I suppose that depends on your comfort level. You know, there are cases
where a good investment banker’s fairness opinion has carried a lot of
weight, and there are cases where it hasn’t. If you have an interested
transaction where the board’s process was weak, was defective to
begin with, and that raises all the red flags in the court’s mind, even a
good fairness opinion is not going to carry the weight that a good
process will. I think the answer is: it depends.
RICHARD PAINTER: Weinberger v. UOP might be one of those
cases.
WILLIAM CARNEY: I want to ask if anybody in the audience has
any more questions? We could go on forever, but I think there’s a
reception waiting out there and I want to thank you all for your
patience. Thank you, panel.
49. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985).

